CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

SYSTEM: SUBSYSTEM:

Propulsion/Nechanical LOZ Propollant Feed J, 12-19-97

FUNCTIONAL CALT: PHASE(S):

REV & DATE: DCW & DATE: ANALYSTS:

HAZARD REF:

P.02, P.06

J. Attar/H. Claybrook

FAILURE MODE:

Loss of Geyser Protection

FAILURE EFFECT:

Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to LOZ tank structural failure resulting in fire/explosion. a)

TIME TO EFFECT:

Seconds

FAILURE CAUSE(S):

Structural Failure of Splash Plate

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

Not Applicable

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION: The splash plate will disperse a gayser, preventing damaging effects should one occur.

FMEA ITEN	PART MO.	PART HAME	<u>oty</u>	EFFECTIVITY
2.1.4.1	80912651013-011	Splesh Plate	1	LUT-54 & Up

REMARKS:		

2,1-5 MASTER

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) CONTINUATION SHEET

SYSTEM: SUBSYSTEM: Propulsion/Mechanical LO2 Propellant Feed

FMEA 1TEM CODE(S): 2.1.4.1

REV & DATE: DEN & DATE: J, 12-19-97

RATIONALE FOR RETENTION

DESIGN:

The splash plate is a component of the anti-wortex assembly that is spliced to the upper edge of the baffle assembly to provide structural rigidity. The location of the plate in line with the feedline inlet provides for the dispersion of geysers in the event one should occur during loading and prelaunch operations. The plate is formed from 2024-162 aluminum and is designed for the required ultimate safety factor of 1.4 for loads and the required yield safety factor of 1.1 for loads. (ET Stress Report 826-2188). Materials safetted in accordance with MMC-ET-SE16 and controlled per MMMA Approved Vendor Product Assurance Plan assures conformance of composition, material compatibility and properties.

TEST:

The Splash Plate is certified. Reference HCS MMC-ET-TMO8-1-P012.

MPTA Firings/Tankings: The splash plate has accumulated 62.5 minutes of firing time, 27 cryogenic cycles, and 42 pressurization cycles. There was no evidence of structural damage resulting from these exposures.

INSPECTION:

Lockheed Martin Procurement Quality Representative:

Verify materials selection and verification controls (drawing 80912651013).

MAF Quality Inspection:

Inspect (visually) attaching hardware for freedom of damage prior to installation (drawing 80912651011).

Inspect (visually) for no damage during post installation shokedown inspection (MPPSO90ZB00SCL for LWT-54 thru 68 and 809ZZ01190D for LWT-69 1 Lp).

FAILURE MISTORY:

Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies and other failures experienced during ground processing activity can be found in the PRACA data base.